Case Study: The Not-So-Wonderful World of EuroDisney

The Walt Disney Company is the parent company of Euro Disney and other Disney company in various countries making it a network of international family entertainment network in all house hold around the world with four business diversification which are media networks, parks and resorts, studio entertainment and consumer products. Disneyland, Disney world and all places Disney have been known as the happiest place on earth, the goal of Walt Disney is opening Disneyland was not to just be a theme park, but to be a theme park that the entire family could enjoy. Although the Walt Disney Company was founded in 1938, it was not until 1952 that the theme park, Disneyland, was opened to the public. When Walt Disney opened an amusement park in the middle of Southern California orange groves in 1955, he changed the way that Americans, and the world, viewed such entertainment. Once the domain of carnival hucksters, amusement parks underwent a significant makeover at the hands of the head of the Disney Studios

Walter Elias Disney is a pioneer, innovator and possessor of one of the most fertile imaginations in the world. He was an American film producer, director, screenwriter, voice actor, animator, entrepreneur, entertainer, international icon and philanthropist. Disney is famous for his influence in the field of entertainment during the twentieth century. As the co-founder (with his brother Roy O. Disney) of Walt Disney Productions, Disney became one of the best-known motion picture producers in the world. The corporation he co-founded, now known as The Walt Disney Company, today has annual revenues of approximately U.S. $35 billion. Disney is particularly noted for being a film producer and a popular showman, as well as an innovator in animation and theme park design. He and his staff created a number of the world’s most famous fictional characters including Mickey Mouse, a character for which Disney himself was the original voice. He received fifty-nine Academy Award nominations and won twenty-six Oscars, including a record four in one year, giving him more awards and nominations than any other individual. He also won seven Emmy Awards. He is the namesake for Disneyland and Walt Disney World Resort theme parks in the United States, Japan, France, and China.

In April 1992, EuroDisney SCA opened its doors to European visitors. Located by the river Marne some 20 miles east of Paris, it was designed to be the biggest and most lavish theme park that Walt Disney (Disney) had built to date-bigger than Disneyland in Anaheim, California; Disneyworld in Orlando, Florida; and Tokyo Disneyland in Japan. In 1989, EuroDisney was expected to be a surefire moneymaker for its parent Disney, led by Chairman Michael Eisner and President Frank Wells. Since then, sadly, Wells was killed in an air accident in spring of 1994, and EuroDisney lost nearly $1 billion during the 1992-1993 fiscal years.

Much to Disney management’s surprise, Europeans failed to “go goofy” over Mickey, unlike their Japanese counterparts. Between 1990 and early 1992, some 14 million people had visited Tokyo Disneyland, with three-quarters being repeat visitors. A family of four staying overnight at a nearby hotel would easily spend $600 on a visit to the park. In contrast, at EuroDisney, families were reluctant to spend the $280 a day needed to enjoy the attractions of the park, including les hamburgers and les milkshakes. Staying overnight was out of the question for many because hotel rooms were so high priced. For example, prices ranged from $110 to $380 a night at the Newport Bay Club, the largest of EuroDisney’s six new hotels and one of the biggest in Europe. In comparison, a room in a top hotel in Paris cost between $340 and $380 a night.

In 1994, financial losses were becoming so massive at EuroDisney that Michael Eisner had to step in personally in order to structure a rescue package. EuroDisney was put back on firm ground. A two -year window of financial peace was introduced, but not until after some acrimonious dealings with French banks had been settled and an unexpected investment by a Saudi prince had been accepted. Disney management rapidly introduced a range of strategic and tactical changes in the hope of “doing it right” this time. Analysts are still trying to diagnose what went wrong and what the future might hold for EuroDisney.

The Not-So-Wonderful World of EuroDisney Case Study

A Real Estate Dream Come True – Expansion into Europe was supposed to be Disney’s major source of growth  in the 1990s, bolstering slowing prospects back home in the United States. “Europe is our big project for the rest of this century,” boasted Robert F. Fitzpatrick, chairman of Euro Disneyland in spring 1990. The Paris location was chosen over 200 other potential sites stretching from Portugal through Spain, France, Italy, and into Greece, Spaing thought it had the strongest bid based on its year-long, temperate, and sunny Mediterranean climate, but insufficient acreage of land was available for development around Barcelona.

In the end, the French government’s generous incentives, together with impressive data on regional demographics, swayed Eisner to choose the Paris location. It was calculated that some 310 million people in Europe live within two hours’ air travel of EuroDisney, and 17 million could reach the park within two hours by car-better demographics than at any other Disney site. Pessimistic talk about the dismal winter weather of northern France was countered with references to the success of Tokyo Disneyland, where resolute visitors brave cold winds and snow to enjoy their piece of Americana. Furthermore, it was argued, Paris is Europe’s most -popular city destination among tourists of all nationalities.

According to the master agreement signed by the French government in March 1987, 51 percent of EuroDisney would be offered to European investors, with about half of the new shares being sold to the French. At the time, the project was valued at about FFr 12 billion ($1.8 billion). Disney’s initial equity stake in EuroDisney was acquired for FFr 850 million (about $127.5 million). After the public offering, the value of Disney’s stake zoomed to $1 billion on the magic of the Disney name.

Inducements by the French government were varied and generous:

  • Loans of up to FFr 4.8 billion at a lower-than-market fixed rate of interest.
  • Tax advantages for writing off construction costs.
  • Construction by the French government, free of charge, of rail and road links from Paris out to the park. The TGV (trés grande vitesse) fast train was scheduled to serve the park by 1994, along with road traffic coming from Britain through the Channel Tunnel, or Chunnel.
  • Land (4,800 acres) sold to Disney at 1971 agricultural prices. Resort and property development going beyond the park itself was projected to bring in about a third of the scheme’s total revenues between 1992 and 1995.

As one analyst commented “EuroDisney could probably make money without Mickey, as a property development alone.” These words would come back to halted Disney in 1994 as real estate development plans were halted and hotel rooms remained empty, some even being closed during the first winter.

Spills and Thrills – Disney had projected that the new theme park would attract 11 millions visitors and generate over $100 million in operating earnings during the first year of operation. EuroDisney was expected to make a small pretax profit of FFr 227 million ($34 million) in 1994, rising to nearly FFr 3 billion ($450 million) in 2001. By summer 1994, EuroDisney had lost more than $900 million since opening. Attendance reached only 9.2 million in 1992, and visitors spent 12 percent less on purchases than the estimated $33 per head. European tour operators were unable to rally sufficient interest among vacationers to meet earlier commitments to fill the park’s hotels, and demanded that EuroDisney renegotiate their deals. In August 1992, Karen Gee, marketing manager of Airtours PLC, a British travel agency, worried about troubles yet to come: “On a foggy February day, how appealing will this park be?” Her winter bookings at that time were dismal. If tourists were not flocking to taste the thrills of the new EuroDisney, where were they going for their summer vacations in 1992? Ironically enough, an unforeseen combination of transatlantic airfare wars and currency movements resulted in trip to Disneyworld in Orlando being cheaper that a trip to Paris with guaranteed good weather and beautiful Floridian beaches within easy reach. EuroDisney management took steps to rectify immediate problems in 1992 by cutting rates at two hotels up to 25 percent, introducing some cheaper meals at restaurants, and launching a Paris ad blitz that proclaimed “California is only 20 miles from Paris”.

An American Icon – One of the most worrying aspects of EuroDisney’s first year was that French visitors stayed away; they had been expected to make up 50 percent of the attendance figures. Two years later, Dennis Speigel, president of the International Theme Park Services consulting firm, based in Cincinnati, Ohio, framed the problem in these words: “The French see EuroDisney as American imperialism -plastics at its worst”. The well-known, sentimental Japanese attachment to Disney characters contrasted starkly with the unexpected and widespread French scorn for American fairy-tale characters. French culture has its own lovable cartoon characters such as Astérix, the helmeted, pint-sized Gallic warrior who has a theme park located near EuroDisney. Parc Astérix went through a major renovation and expansion in anticipation of competition from EuroDisney . Hostility among the French people to the whole “Disney-idea” had surfaced early in the planning of the new project. Paris theater director Ariane Mnouchkine became famous for her description of EuroDisney as” a cultural Chernobyl.” A 1988 book, Mickey: The Sting, by French journalist Gilles Smadja de nounced the $350 million that the government had committed at that time to building park-related infrastructure. In fall 1989, during a visit to Paris, Michyael Eisner was pelted with eggs by French Communists. Finally, many farmers took to the streets to protest against the preferential sales price of local land. The joke going around at the time was, “For EuroDisney to adapt properly to France, all seven of Snow White´s dwarfs should be named Grumpy (Grincheux)”.

Early advertising by EuroDisney seemed to aggravate local French sentiment by emphasizing glitz and size, rather than the variety of rides and attractions. Committed to maintaining Disney´s reputation for quality in everything, Chairman Eisner insisted that more and more detail be built into EuroDisney. For example, the centerpiece castle in the Magic Kingdom had to be bigger and fancier than in the other parks. He ordered the removal of two steel staircases in Discoveryland, at a cost of $200,000 to $300,000, because they blocked a view of the Star Tours ride. Expensive trams were built along a lake to take guests from the hotels to the park, but visitors preferred walking. An 18-hole golf course, built to adjoin 600 new vacation homes, was constructed and then enlarged to add another 9 holes. Built before the homes, the course cost $15 to $20 million and remains underused. Total park construction cost were estimated at FFr 14 billion ($2.37billion) in 1989 but rose by $340 million to FFr 16 billion as a result of all these add-ons. Hotel construction costs alone rose from an estimated FFr 3.4 billion to FFr 5.7 billion. EuroDisney and Disney managers unhappily succeeded in alienating many of their counterparts in the government, the banks, the ad agencies and other concerned organizations. A barnstorming, kick-the-door-down attitude seemed to reign among the U.S. decision makers. Beatrice Descoffre, a French construction industry official, complained that “They were always sure it would work because they were Disney”. A top French banker involved in setting up the master agreement felt that Disney executives had tied to steamroller their ideas. “They had a formidable image and convinced everyone that if we let them do it their way, we would all have a marvelous adventure”. Disney executives consistently decline to comment on their handling of management decisions during the early days, but point out that many of the same people complaining about Disney’s aggressiveness were only too happy to sign on with Disney before conditions deteriorated. One former Disney executive voiced the opinion, “We were arrogant-it was like ‘We’re building the Taj Mahal and people will come- on our terms.’’’

Storm Clouds ahead – Disney and its advisors failed to see signs at the end of the 1980s of the approaching European recession. As one former executive said, “We were just trying to keep our heads above water. Between the glamour and the pressure of opening and the intensity of the project itself, we didn’t realize a major recession was coming”. Other dramatic events included the Gulf War in 1991, which put a heavy brake on vacation travel for the rest of that year. The fall of communism in 1989 after the destruction of the Berlin Wall provoked far-reaching effects on the world economy, National defense industries were drastically reduced among Western nations. Foreign aid was requested from the West by newly emerging democracies in Eastern Europe. Other external factors that Disney executives have cited in the past as contributing to their financial difficulties at EuroDisney were high interest rates and the devaluation of several currencies against the franc. Difficulties were also encountered by EuroDisney with regard to competition. Landmark events took place in Spain in 1992. The world’s Fair in Seville and the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona were huge attractions for European tourists. New parks were planned for Spain by Anheuser-Busch, with its $300 million Busch Gardens near Barcelona, as well as Six Flags Corporation’s Magic Mountain park, to be located in Marbella. Disney management’s conviction that it knew best was demonstrated by its much-trumpeted ban on alcohol in the park. This proved insensitive to the local culture because the French are the world’s biggest consumers of wine. To them a meal without un verre de rouge is unthinkable. Disney relented. It also had to relax its rules on personal grooming of the projected 12.000 cast members, the park employees. Women were allowed to wear redder nail polish than in the United States, but the taboo on men’s facial hair was maintained. “We want the clean-shaven, neat and tidy look”, commented David Kannally, director of Disney University’s Paris branch. The “university” trains prospective employees in Disney values and culture by means of a one-and-a-half-day seminar. Eurodisney’s management did, however, compromise on the question of pets. Special Kennels were built to house visitors’ animals. The thought of leaving a pet at home during vacation is considered irrational by many French people.

Plans for further development of EuroDisney after 1992 were ambitious. The initial number of hotel rooms was planned to be 5,200, more than in the entire city of Cannes on the Cote d’Azur. This number was supposed to triple in a few years as Disney opened a second theme park to keep visitors at the EuroDisney resort for a longer stay. There would also be a huge amount of office space, 700,000 square meters, just slightly smaller France’s largest office complex. La Defense in Paris. Also planned were shopping malls, apartments, golf courses, and vacation homes. EuroDisney would design and build everything itself, with a view to selling at a profit. As a Disney executive commented with hindsight, “Disney at various points could have had partners to share the risk, or buy the hotels outright. But it didn’t want to give up the upside”.

Disney management wanted to avoid two costly mistakes it had made in the past: letting others build the money-making hotels surrounding a park (as happened at Disneyland in Anaheim), and letting another company own a Disney park (as in Tokyo, where Disney just collects royalties). This time, along with 49 percent ownership of EuroDisney would receive both a park management fee and royalties on merchandise sales. The outstanding success record of Chairman Eisner and President Wells in reviving Disney during the 1980s led people to believe that the duo could do nothing wrong. “From the time they came on, they had never made a single misstep, never a mistake, never a failure” said a former Disney executive. “There was a tendency to believe that everything they touched would be perfect.” This belief was fostered by the incredible growth record achieved by Eisner and Wells. In the seven years before EuroDisney opened, they took Disney from being a company with $1 billion in revenues to one with $8.5 billion, mainly through internal growth. Dozens of banks, led by France’s Banque Nationale de Paris, Banque Indosuez, and Caisse des Depots & Consignations, eagerly signed on to provide construction loans. One bancker who saw the figures for the deal expressed concern. “The company was overleveraged. The structure was dangerous.” Other critics charged that the proposed financing was risky because it relied on capital gains from future real estate transactions.

The Disney response to this criticism was that those views reflected the cautious, Old World thinking of Europeans who didn’t understand U.S.-style free market financing. Supporters of Disney point out that for more than two years after the initial public offering of shares, the stock price continued to do well, and that initial loans were at a low rate. It was the later cost overruns and the necessity for a bailout at the end of the first year that undermined the initial forecasts. Optimistic assumptions that the 1980s boom in real estate in Europe would continue through the 1990s and that interest rates and currencies would remain stable led Disney to rely heavily on debt financing. The real estate developments outside EuroDisney were supposed to draw income to help pay down the $3.4 billion in debt. That in turn was intended to help Disney finance a second park close by- an MGM Studios film tour site-that would draw visitors to help fill existing hotel rooms. None of this happened. As a senior French banker commented later in 1994, EuroDisney is a “good theme park married to a bankrupt real estate company and the two can’t be divorced.”

Telling and Selling Fairy Tales – Mistaken assumptions by the Disney management team affected construction design, marketing and pricing policies, and park management, as well as initial financing. For example, parking space for buses proved much too small. Restroom facilities for drivers could accommodate 50 people; on peak days there were 200 drivers. With regard to demand for meal service, Disney executives had been erroneously informed that Europeans don’t eat breakfast. Restaurant breakfast service was downsized accordingly, and guess what? “Everybody showed up for breakfast. We were trying to serve 2,500 breakfasts inn a 350-seat restaurant [at some of the hotels]. The lines were horrendous. And they didn’t just want croissants and coffee. They wanted bacon and eggs” lamented one Disney executive. Disney reacted quickly, delivering prepackaged breakfasts to rooms and other satellite locations. In contrast to Disney’s American parks where visitors typically stay at least three days, EuroDisney is at most a two -day visit. Energetic visi tors need even less time. Jeff Summers, an analyst at debt broker Klesch & Company in London, claims to have “done” every EuroDisney ride in just five hours. “There aren’t enough attractions to get people to spend the night,” he commented in summer 1994. Typically many guests arrive early in the morning, rush to the park, come back to their hotel late at night, then check out the next morning before heading back to the park. The amount of check-in and check-out -traffic was vastly underestimated when the park opened; extra computer terminals were installed rapidly in the hotels.

In promoting the new park to visitors, Disney did not stress the entertainment value of a visit to the new theme park. The emphasis on the size of the park “ruined the magic”, said a Paris based ad agency executive. But in early 1993, ads were changed to feature Zorro, a French favorite; Mary Poppins; and Aladdin, star of the huge money-making movie success. A print ad campaign at that time featured Aladdin, Cinderella’s castle, and a little girl being invited to enjoy a “magic vacation”. A promotional package was offered –two days, one night, and one breakfast at an unnamed EuroDisney hotel –for $95 per adult and free for kids. The tagline said, “The kingdom where all dreams come true”. Early in 1994 the decision was taken to add six new attractions. In March the Temple of Peril ride opened, Storybook Land followed in May; and the Nautilus attraction was planned for June. Donald Duck’s birthday was celebrated on June 9. A secret new thrill ride was promised in 1995. “We are positioning EuroDisney as the No.1 European destination of short duration, one to three days”, said a park spokesperson. Previously no effort had been made to hold visitors for a specific length of stay. Moreover, added the spokesperson, “One of our primary messages is, after all, that EuroDisney is affordable to everyone”. Although new package deals and special low season rates substantially offset costs to visitors, the overall entrance fee has not been changed and is higher than in the United States.

With regard to park management, seasonal disparities in attendance have caused losses in projected revenues. Even on a day -to-day basis EuroDisney management has had difficulty forecasting numbers of visitors. Early expectations were that Monday could be a light day for visitors, and Friday a heavy one. Staff allocations were made accordingly. The opposite was true. EuroDisney management still struggles to find the right level of staffing at a park where high-season attendance can be ten times the number in the low season. The American tradition of “hiring and firing” employees at will is difficult, if not impossible, in France, where workers’ rights are stringently protected by law. Disney executives had optimistically expected that the arrival of their new theme park would cause French parents to take their children out of school in midseason for a short break. It did not happen, unless a public holiday occurred over a weekend. Similarly, Disney expected that the American-style short but more frequent family trips would displace the European tradition of a one month family vacation, usually taken in August. However, French office and factory schedules remained the same, with their emphasis on an August shutdown.

Tomorrowland – Faced with falling share prices and crisis talk among shareholders, Disney was forced to step forward in late 1993 to rescue the new park. Disney announced that it would fund EuroDisney until a financial restructuring could be worked out with lenders. However, it was made clear by the parent company, Disney, that it “was not writing a blank check”.

In November 1993, it was announced that an allocation of $350 million to deal with EuroDisney’s problems had resulted in the first quarterly loss for Disney in nine years. Reporting on fourth-quarter results for 1993, Disney announced its share of EuroDisney losses as $517 million for fiscal 1993. The overall performance of Disney was not, however, affected. It reported a profit of nearly $300 million for the fiscal year ending September 30 1993, thanks to strong performance by its U.S. theme parks and movies produced by its entertainment division. This compared with a profit of $817 million for the year before.

The rescue plan developed in fall 1993 was rejected by the French banks. Disney fought back by imposing a deadline for agreement of March 31, 1994, and even hinted at possible closure of EuroDisney. By mid-March, Disney’s commitment to support EuroDisney had risen to $750 million. A new preliminary deal struck with EuroDisney’s lead banks required the banks to contribute some $500 million. The aim was to cut the park’s high-cost debt in half and make EuroDisney profitable by 1996, a date considered unrealistic by many analysts. The plan called for a rights offering of FFr 6 billion (about $1.02 billion at current rates) to existing shareholders at below market prices. Disney would spend about $508 million to buy 49 percent of the offering. Disney also agreed to buy certain EuroDisney park assets for $240 million and lease them back to EuroDisney on favourable terms. Banks agreed to forgive 18 months of interest payments on outstanding debt and would defer all principal payments for three years. Banks would also under write the remaining 51 percent of the rights offering. For its part, Disney agreed to eliminate for five years its lucrative management fees and royalties on the sale of tickets and merchandise. Royalties would gradually be reintroduced at a lower level. Analysts commented that approval by EuroDisney’s 63 creditor banks and its shareholders was not a foregone conclusion. Also, the future was clouded by the need to resume payment of debt interest and royalties after the two-year respite.

Prince Charming Arrives – In June 1994, EuroDisney received a new lifeline when a member of the Saudi royal family agreed to invest up to $500 million for a 24 percent stake in the park. Prince Al -Walid bin Talal bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud is a well-known figure in the world of high finance. Years ago he expressed the desire to be worth $5 billion by 1998. Western -educated, His Royal Highness Prince Al-Walid holds stock in Citicorp worth $ 1.6 billion and is its biggest shareholder. The prince has an established reputation in world markets as a “bottom-fisher,” buying into potentially viable operations during crises when share prices are low. He also holds II percent of Saks Fifth Avenue and owns a chain of hotels and supermarkets, his own United Saudi commercial Bank in Riyadh, a Saudi construction company, and part of the new Arab Radio and Television Network in the Middle East. The prince plans to build a $ 100 million convention center at Euro Disney. One of the few pieces of good news about EuroDsney is that its convention business exceeded expectations from the beginning. The prince’s investment could reduce Disney’s stake in EuroDisney to as little as 36 percent. The prince agreed not to increase the size of his holding for 10 years. He also agreed that if his EuroDisney stake ever exceeds 50 percent of Disney’s, he must liquidate that portion. The prince loves Disney culture. He has visited both EuroDisney and Disney world. He believes in the EuroDisney management team. Positive factors supporting his investment include the continuing European economic recovery, increased parity between European currencies the opening of the Chunnel, and what is seen as a certain humbling in the attitude of Disney executives. Jeff Summers, analyst for Klesch & Company in London, commented on the deal, saying that Disney now has a fresh chance “to show that Europe really needs an amusement park that will have cost $5 billion.

Management and Name Changes – Frenchman Philippe Bourguignon took over at EuroDisney as CEO in 1993 and has navigated the theme park back to profitability. He was instrumental in the negotiation with the firm’s bankers, cutting a deal that he credits largely for bringing the park back into the black. Perhaps more important to the long-run success of the venture were his changes in marketing. The pan-European approach to marketing was dumped, and national markets were targeted separately. This new localization took into account the differing tourist’s habits around the continent. Separate marketing offices were opened in London, Frankfurt, Milan, Brussels, Amsterdam, and Madrid, and each was charged with tailoring advertising and packages to its own market. Princes were cut by 20 percent for park admission and 30 percent for some hotel room rates. Special promotions were also run for the winter months. The central theme of the new marketing and operations approach is that people visit the park for an “authentic” Disney day out. They may not be completely sure what that means, except that it entails something American. This is reflected in the transformation of the park’s name. The “Euro” in Eurodisney was first shrunk in the logo, and the word “land” added. Then in October 1994 the “Euro” was eliminated completely; the park is now called Disneyland Paris.

In 1996 Disneyland Paris became France’s most visited tourist attraction, ahead of both the Louvre Art Museum and the Eiffel Tower, 11.7 million visitors (a 9 percent increase from the previous year) allowed the park to report another profitable year. However the architect of this remarkable recovery left the firm. Despite a promotion to executive vice president of Disney’s European operations, Mr. Bourguignon resigned to become chairman of Club Mediterranee. Some say he was interested in another turn -around project-Club Med had had big problems, including huge losses in customers and profits. Others conjecture that Mr. Bourguignon’s departure had more to do with big challenges facing Disneyland Paris in the immediate future. That is financial concessions given by bankers and shareholders as part of the restructuring were gradually beginning to expire, and some analysts saw storm clouds again on the horizon.

Theme Park Expansion in the 21st Century – With the recovery of Disneyland Paris, the division embarked on an ambitious growth plan. In 2001 the California Adventure Park was added to the Anaheim complex at a cost of $1.4 billion. Through agreements with foreign partners, Disney will also open three new theme parks, in Tokyo Seas, also to be opened in 2001), Paris, and Hong Kong, during the next five years-while spending only $400 million of its own money to do so. Executives are hoping that the return on that investment will be in the neighborhood of 30 percent, based on licensing fees and entrance fees.


  1. What factors contribute to EuroDisney’s poor performance during its first year of operation?
  2. To what degree do you consider that these factors were a) foreseeable and b) controllable by either EuroDisney or the parent company, Disney?
  3. What role does ethnocentrism play in the story of EuroDisney’s launch?
  4. How do you assess the cross-cultural marketing skills of Disney?
  5. Do you think success in Tokyo predisposed Disney management to be too optimistic in their expectation of success in France? Explain.
  6. Do you think the new theme park would have encountered the same problems if a location in Spain had been selected? Explain.
  7. Assess Disney’s new expansion strategy. Does their current approach of limited investment make sense in all new markets? If not, where not? Explain.
  8. Now that Disney has succeeded in turning around Disneyland Paris and has begun work on the new Hong Kong location, where and when should it go next? Assumed you are a consultant hired to give Disney advice on the issue of where and when to go next. Pick three locations and select the one you think will be the bes new location for “Disneyland X” and explain why.
  9. Resume the experience at EuroDisney, make a check list of things not to forget in the following Disney’s project.